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Housing Benefit (HB) in the UK subsidizes the rent of tenants in both the private and public 
sectors.  Its share in total welfare benefits has risen markedly through time and there is 
widespread dissatisfaction with it.  But, reform has been very slow.  One important issue is 
the extent to which the incidence of HB is actually on the tenants.  Exploiting two data sets 
from the mid-1990s when the subsidy regime changed for some tenants but not for others, 
this paper explores the incidence.  We find that some of the incidence is on landlords though 
our two data sets differ in the extent to which this is true.  We also find evidence in support of 
a ‘matching’ model of the rental market rather than a perfectly competitive one. 
 
JEL Classification:  H22, R31 
Keywords:  Housing Subsidies, Tax Incidence 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research 






We would like to thank Gabrielle Fack for her comments on this paper. 
 Stephen Gibbons is a Research Associate at the Centre for Economic Performance 
and a Lecturer in Economic Geography, London School of Economics.  Alan Manning is a 
Programme Director at the Centre for Economic Performance and Professor in Economics, 






Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval 
system or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of 
the publisher nor be issued to the public or circulated in any form other than that in which it 
is published. 
 
Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent 
to the editor at the above address. 
 
Ó S. Gibbons and A. Manning, submitted 2003 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1675 3 
 




The UK social security system has undergone enormous changes in the past twenty years. 
But Housing Benefit (HB), the benefit that subsidises the housing of tenants (of either public 
or private landlords) has hardly changed at all. The details of Housing Benefit are described 
later in the paper but, essentially, Housing Benefit pays 100% of rents up to a maximum level 
and is subject to a means test. The lack of change is not because Housing Benefit is thought 
to be a successful welfare benefit: it has long been regarded as ripe for reform1. There are a 
number of reasons for concern about the operation and effects of HB.  
First, the cost has escalated rapidly. Because HB pays 100% of rents for many tenants, 
there is little incentive for tenants to resist landlords who want to raise rents or to shop around 
for cheaper accommodation. This became a particular problem after the de-regulation of rents 
in the private-sector in 1989 when there was a rapid rise in private sector rents and a 
corresponding rise in Housing Benefit payments. Figure 1 presents a time series on real rents 
in the private rental sector for workless households (the vast majority of whom will be 
receiving HB) and working households (the vast majority of whom will not be receiving HB). 
What is noticeable is that the rents for workless households are similar to those for working 
households even though their income is lower, almost certainly because of the impact of HB. 
And rents for both groups rose very fast in the early 1990s after the end of rent controls at a 
time when house prices generally were falling. 
A related problem is that, while most welfare benefits have been indexed to retail 
prices, Housing Benefit is effectively indexed to rental rates that have tended to rise more 
rapidly than the retail price index (to a first approximation, housing costs might be thought to 
be closely related to wages). Figure 2 presents a time-series for 1991-2001 on the proportion 
of Housing Benefit in the most important welfare benefits for working age households.  In 
1991 HB was 21% of these benefits: this rose to 30% by the mid 1990s. 
A second area of concern about HB is that the high level of withdrawal associated with 
Housing Benefit as income increases (the taper rate for much of the period is 65%) acts as an 
important component of the high marginal tax rate facing low-income households and, hence, 
                                                 
1 That may now be about to happen. The housing ‘Green Paper’ (DETR, 2000) contained an array of proposals 
for improving Housing Benefit and this has been followed up by a specific proposal for very radical reform 
(DWP, 2002), namely to replace HB with a housing allowance that is paid to tenants even if rents are below that 
level. 
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acts as a powerful disincentive to work (see Bingley and Walker, 2001, for an analysis of 
this). 
Thirdly the complexity of the system and the inefficiency of its administration create a 
great deal of uncertainty in the minds of both tenant and landlord about the exact level of 
benefit that is likely to be received. 
But, while there has been a widespread feeling that the system needs reform, 
governments have proceeded with extreme caution. The main explanation for this is probably 
that there will almost certainly be ‘losers’ from any system of Housing Benefit reform and 
politicians fear the dreadful publicity which would surround the eviction of families from 
their home because their Housing Benefit payments had fallen and they could no longer 
afford the rent.  
However, much of the discussion of HB implicitly assumes that the incidence of the 
subsidy is fully on the tenant so that, for example, any reduction in Housing Benefit will 
make tenants worse off. But, as private-sector rental housing is not likely to be in elastic 
supply in the short-run, one might expect that a large part of the incidence falls on landlords. 
The fact that the proportion of individuals living in private-rented accommodation has hardly 
changed after the abolition of rent controls even though rents have risen sharply suggests that 
the elasticity in the supply of private rental housing is not high: the proportion of individuals 
living in private-rented accommodation was 9% in 1980, 5% in 1990 and 9% in 2000. A 
recent paper by Susin (2002) considered the incidence of rent vouchers in the United States 
and concluded that rent vouchers caused rents to rise by so much that low-income households 
were actually worse off and landlords were much better-off (i.e. there was over-shifting). 
This paper estimates the incidence of HB in the UK by looking at the impact of certain 
changes to the administration of Housing Benefit that were made in 1996 and 1997 on rents 
and benefit receipt. It exploits the fact that the changes affected only new claims so that the 
new rules were applied only to a fraction of tenants. It aims to answer several questions: 
- What was the effect of the changes on Housing Benefit payments? 
- What was the effect on private-sector rents? 
- What was the effect on the quality of private-sector rented accommodation? 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section (2) we provide some more 
information about the operation of the HB system and the changes made in the 1990s. Then, 
in Section 3, we discuss the likely impact of the changes to HB on the rental market using a 
simple model. We contrast the predictions of a competitive model of the housing market 
where rents are determined ‘in the market’, independently of the circumstances of any 
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individual, with a matching model in which the rent is determined in a bargain between 
landlord and prospective tenant. Section 4 describes our empirical methods and data, and 
Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Housing Benefit and the 1990s Changes 
 
The basic features of the system can be described simply. Both private-sector and public-
sector tenants can apply for Housing Benefit which can pay up to 100% of their rent. Public 
sector tenants generally receive their housing benefit as a rent rebate. Private sector tenants 
receive a rent allowance. There are two main reasons why Housing Benefit may pay less than 
100% of the rent. 
First, Housing Benefit is means-tested and is withdrawn at a high taper rate as the 
claimants’ household income increases. Currently the taper is 65% so that Housing Benefit is 
an important contributor to the high marginal tax rates faced by those on low incomes (and 
the marginal tax rate is even higher once one recognizes that most Housing Benefit recipients 
will also be receiving Council Tax Benefit that is withdrawn at a taper rate of 20%). 
 Secondly, there are restrictions on the maximum amount of rent that will be covered 
by Housing Benefit: these restrictions are decided by the rent officer in the Local Authority 
where the claimant lives2. Prior to 1996 the Housing Benefit could be restricted to less than 
the rent if the rent was above the market level for the accommodation or the accommodation 
was too large for the claimant’s household or the rent was exceptionally expensive. 
Beginning in 1996, a number of further restrictions were introduced. First, the concept of a 
‘Local Reference Rent’ (LRR), the average market rate for the accommodation in the local 
area was introduced. From January 1996 to October 1997, 50% of the rent in excess of the 
LRR was eligible for Housing Benefit: from October 1997 this entitlement was removed and 
no Housing Benefit was payable on the excess of rent above the LRR. Secondly, in October 
1996, new claims by single people aged under 25 were restricted to the ‘single room rent’ 
(SRR), the average rent in the local area for a single room with shared facilities. An 
                                                 
2 These restrictions effectively apply to ‘deregulated’ private-sector tenants only. Public -sector, and ‘regulated’ 
private sector rents are typically below market levels and are not referred to rent officers. A tiny minority of 
Registered Social Landlord rents are also assessed under the LRR scheme – 13,000 out of 1,775,000 in May 
2002 (Department of Work and Pensions, 2002). 
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additional reform introduced in 1996 was to change the Housing Benefit system to payment 
in arrears. The Housing Benefit system is outlined in more detail in Appendix A. 
 The rules that are used with regard to each Housing Benefit application are the rules 
that were applied when the claim was first made so the 1996 changes only had an impact on 




3. The Impact of the Changes:  Theory 
 
In this section, we describe the likely consequences in the private-sector rental market of the 
changes to the HB system. A first question (addressed below in the empirical part of the 
paper) is to what extent the changes have actually reduced HB payments: for the purposes of 
this section, we will assume that they have. 
 First consider how one can model in a simple way, the impact of Housing Benefit. 
The level of subsidy is determined by the rent, r, if it falls below the maximum allowable and 
the maximum allowable, r*, if it does not. One of the features of the system noted (and 
criticised) by many commentators is that the process that determines r* is a mystery to most 
claimants and subject to a great deal of uncertainty. For example, Kemp (2000, p17) reports 
that 70% of private tenants on Housing Benefit agreed with the statement that “it is hard to 
know what the local authority will accept in rent for Housing Benefit”. So, assume that r* is a 
random variable with density function f(r*). The expected housing subsidy, S(r) is then given 
by: 
 ( )( ) [ ]( ) min , * 1 ( ) * ( *) *rS r E r r r F r r f r dr= = - + ò  (1) 
 
Differentiating this we have that the expected subsidy varies with the rent according to: 
 [ ]( ) 1 ( )S r F r¢ = -  (2) 
 
i.e. the marginal expected subsidy rate is the probability of the rent not being restricted. 
If there are more stringent restrictions imposed on the allowable rent then the distribution of 
r* will shift down and both the average and marginal subsidy rates will fall. So, we will 
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model the impact of a tightening of the restrictions on the maximum allowable rent as a fall 
in the subsidy rate that, to keep the theory simple, we assume is a linear one. 
 In the theory that follows we assume that all agents are risk-neutral so that it is only 
the expected subsidy that matters. Of course, this is not plausible especially for the tenants for 
whom a determination that their previously agreed rent is excessive can cause very real 
hardship as the decision is quite likely to be received after they have signed a tenancy 
agreement. One should also recognize that the subjective probabilities attached by claimants 
to the probability of having their Housing Benefit restricted may be some distance from 
reality e.g. Kemp (2000, p22) reports that 45% of private tenants said they did not know 
whether the local authority would increase their Housing Benefit if the rent was increased. 
We leave the implications of the uncertainty in the Hous ing Benefit subsidy to another paper. 
We will consider a couple of models of rent determination: a competitive model and a 
matching model. 
 
3.1. A competitive model 
 
First, consider a standard market-clearing model in which there is a single rent, r, per unit of 
housing consumed in the market. Assume the supply of housing is given by Hs(r) and that the 
demand for housing comes from (for simplicity) two groups, one of which is going to have its 
subsidy reduced (as happened in the HB reforms described in the previous section).  Let us 
describe the two groups as the treated and the untreated: we are going to consider the impact 
of a reduction in the housing subsidy for the former group 3.  Assume that the demand for 
housing from the untreated is given by ( )duH r  (this will incorporate any subsidy they might 
be receiving) and from the treated by ( )dtH rr  where r  is the fraction of the actual rent paid 
(so is one minus the subsidy rate). We are interested in how rents are affected by changes in 
r . For simplicity assume that the elasticity of housing demand with respect to rents is the 
same for the treated and untreated (denote it by de- ), that the elasticity of the supply of 
housing with respect to rents is given by se , and that the share of housing demand from the 
treated is given by q . Then the standard formula for the effect of a subsidy on the rent, r, is 
given by: 
                                                 
3 The terminology here is chosen to reflect the empirical application later in the paper. But, the set-up can be 















The higher is the elasticity of the demand for and the lower is the elasticity of supply of 
private-rental housing the larger will be the impact of the subsidy reduction on rents. In this 
situation a reduction in the subsidy (an increase in r ) will reduce the rent per unit of housing 
by the same amount both for those treated and those untreated with the effect being largest in 
markets where a higher fraction of tenants are affected by the subsidy reduction. If tenants 
can choose the quantity and/or quality of their housing we would expect the treated to reduce 
the amount of housing consumed more than the untreated even though the rent per unit of 
housing is the same for the two groups. 
 So, a competitive model predicts that, controlling for the quality and quantity of 
housing, rents will change by equal amounts for those affected and unaffected by the change 
in the subsidy. One can estimate the incidence of the subsidy by seeing how much more rents 
fall in markets where a large proportion of tenants are affected by the change. This is 
essentially the set-up used by Susin (2002) in his analysis of the incidence of US rental 
vouchers. 
In a competitive market a finding that rents change more for those affected by for the 
subsidy reduction more than those unaffected would suggest a failure (perhaps 
understandable given the quality of most available data) to control adequately for the quality 
and quantity of housing. However, there are alternative plausible models of the housing 
market in which those affected by the subsidy reduction have their rents fall when rents are 
restricted by more than those who are not affected even for the same accommodation. 
Perhaps the simplest form of alternative model is a matching model. 
 
3.2. A matching model 
 
In matching model, rents are negotiated between landlord and tenant so differences in subsidy 
status will be reflected in the rent paid per unit of housing. A search model with negotiation 
between the two sides of the housing market has been used in the analysis of owner-
7 
occupation (e.g. Wheaton, 1990) but also seems appropriate for the rental sector as survey 
evidence suggests that some negotiation does take place4. 
Consider the following very stylised model of the private-rental market. As in the 
model of the previous section, there are two types of tenants, the treated (who are affected by 
a subsidy reduction) and the untreated (who are not) but only one type of flat. To keep 
matters simple we assume that the treatment status of tenants is fixed through time. Assume 
that the per-period utility from the consumption of housing services for untreated tenants is 
given by y-rru where ru is the rent paid to the landlord and r is the fraction of the rent that the 
tenant pays. On the other hand, treated tenants pay a higher fraction (r+h) of their rent so 
their per-period utility is given by [y-(r+h)rt]. 
Those potential tenants without accommodation are assumed to have a per-period 
utility of 0 (think of this as staying with friends or family). They are matched with potential 
flats at a rate b . Tenants of both types are assumed to leave flats at an exogenous rate s. 
Define the value functions for untreated and treated tenants to be Vu and Vt respectively 
and for untreated and treated individuals looking for a flat to be Vu0 and Vt0 respectively. 
Using the information given above we must have: 
 0( )u u u uV y r s V Vd r= - + -  (4) 
 0( ) ( )t t t tV y r s V Vd r h= - + + -  (5) 
 0 0( )u u uV V Vd b= -  (6) 
 0 0( )t t tV V Vd b= -  (7) 
Now, let us consider things from the perspective of the landlord. A vacant flat matches 
with a potential tenant at a rate g and a fraction q of matches are assumed to be affected by 
the subsidy reduction (so are in the treated group). For simplicity let us assume that the 
number of flats and people in the market are equal so that g b= : nothing of importance 
depends on this. 
Define Pu and Pt  to be the value of a flat if there is an untreated or treated tenant 
respectively and P0 to be the value of an empty flat. These value functions will be given by: 
 0( )u u ur sdP = + P - P  (8) 
 0( )t t tr sdP = + P - P  (9) 
                                                 
4 Although the evidence also suggests that any negotiation takes place before the tenancy agreement is signed 
and is not renegotiated ex post if, as is quite common, the Housing Benefit is restricted (see Kemp, 2000). 
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 [ ]0 0 0(1 )( ) ( )u td g q qP = - P - P + P - P  (10) 
Now, let us consider our assumptions about rent determination. We will assume that the 
rent is chosen to maximise an asymmetric Nash bargain between landlord and tenant so that: 
 10 0argmax ( ) ( )i i i ir V V
l l-é ù= P - P -ë û  (11) 
The solution to this model is derived in the Appendix B. The solution for the rents is: 
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We can represent these two relationships between the rents in Figure 3 where (12) is 
represented by the line Ru and (13) by the line Rt.  In the initial situation where the treated and 
untreated are the same (h=0), rents will be equal.  
If there is a fall in the subsidy for the treated group so that now h>0, the Rt line will 
shift to the left. As can be seen from inspection of Figure 3, both rents will fall, though that of 
the treated will fall more. The net rent paid by tenants suffering the subsidy reduction must 
rise so not all the incidence is on the landlord. The intuition for this is that, as the subsidy for 
the untreated is unaffected, the relative profits of renting to an untreated tenant rise and this 
strengthens the hand of the landlord when bargaining with the treated group. 
Also note that, as in the competitive market the fraction of those receiving the subsidy 
affects the size of the change in rents with larger effects in markets with higher proportions of 
tenants affected. 
If the markets for treated and untreated tenants are completely segmented5 so either 
0q =  or 1q = , then we get the very simple equations that: 
 ( ) (1 )tr yr h l+ = -  (14) 
and: 
 (1 )ur yr l= -  (15) 
(14) says that, in this case,  the amount of the rental payment by the tenant is 
independent of the level of the subsidy so that the incidence will always be on the landlord. 
The conclusions of this theoretical discussion can be summarized as: 
                                                 
5 Note this is not implausible. Many landlords are unwilling to let to Housing Benefit claimants, or, in the “Buy-
to-Let” market are prevented from doing so by their mortgage terms and conditions. 
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1. In a competitive market, rents for the same accommodation will be independent 
of the level of subsidy received by the tenant but the impact on rents of any 
change in the subsidy will be larger in markets where a higher fraction of tenants 
are affected. 
2. In a competitive market a reduction in subsidy for some tenants can only lead to 
larger changes in rents for those suffering the reduction compared to those who 
do not if one has inadequately controlled for the quantity and/or quality of the 
accommodation. 
3. In a matching model, a reduction in subsidy for some tenants would be expected 
to have a larger effect on rents for the treated than the untreated. 
4. The size of the change in rents will also be affected by the proportion of tenants 
having their subsidy reduced. 
In the empirical part of the paper we look for these impacts of individual treatment and 
the proportion treated in the local area to see what the incidence of the subsidy is and to shed 
light on the appropriate model of rent determination. 
 
 
4. Empirical Specification 
 
4.1. Basic strategy 
 
In the empirical section of the paper, we describe how the benefit reforms have changed the 
rental housing market in England, and test the matching model of Section 3.2 against the 
competitive model of Section 3.1 using the conclusions of those sections. Our objective is to 
model the impact of the post-1996 Housing Benefit reforms on a number of outcomes for 
households in the rental sector. We look at the impacts on 
1. Housing Benefit receipt 
2. Rents 
3. The benefit-to-rent ratio 
4. Housing ‘quality’, measured by the number of rooms occupied by the household. 
To do this, we estimate simple OLS regressions of the form: 
itititit xzy egb +¢+¢=  (16) 
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where ity  is the outcome variable for household i in period t, itx  is a vector of tenancy 
characteristics, year, region and other dummy variables, and itz  is a vector of ‘treatment’ 
variables. Our basic ‘treatment’ variables relate to whether the new Housing Benefit rules 
apply to a household in our data set. These relate to two rule changes: those that occurred in 
January 1996, when the Local Reference Rent system first came into operation, and those that 
occurred in October 1997 when the rent restrictions were fully implemented. Unfortunately, 
we have no direct information about whether the household’s Housing Benefit application 
was subject to the post-1996 rules. But we know that the new rules apply to private tenants 
who: 1) started their tenancy after the relevant date (January 1996 or October 1997) and 
claimed Housing Benefit, or 2) became eligible for Housing Benefit through low income or 
unemployment. So we calculate the probability that the any Housing Benefit claim was 
subject to the new rules from information on length of tenancy, interview date, and year in 
which the head of household last worked. These variables are our treatment variables. 
 
4.2. Interpretation in the light of the theoretical models 
 
Let us define: 
bb : treatment coefficients in the Housing Benefit equation 
rb : treatment coefficients in the rent equation 
sb : treatment coefficients in the benefits/rent ratio equation 
qb : treatment coefficients in the housing quality (rooms) equation 
If Housing Benefit reforms have any ‘bite’ then we would at least expect 0bb < : 
tenants making new claims after the reform receive lower benefits than they would have done 
before. 
The parameters in the other equations are informative about the extent to which the 
burden of the benefit reforms is borne by tenants or landlords. In general, part of the benefit 
is borne by landlords if r bb b£ , unless 0qb < . Consider the following extreme cases in the 
competitive model with a downward sloping housing demand curve: 
1. The housing market is competitive, but the supply of rental housing to the 
benefit-claiming sector is completely inelastic. The benefit reforms result in 
falling benefits, falling rents (the size of which will be related to the fraction of 
tenants affected by the subsidy reduction) and no change in the quality of rental 
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housing within the entire Housing Benefit claiming sector. The impact on rents is 
felt throughout this sector, not just by new claimants6, so in our models of 
individual treatment effects 0bb < ; 0rb = , 0qb = . 
2. The housing market is competitive, but the supply of housing to the benefit 
claiming rental sector is perfectly elastic. Benefit reform leads to falling benefits, 
but rents for a given quantity and quality of housing do not fall. The treated may 
downsize their accommodation or reduce other consumption. 0bb < ; 0rb = , 
possibly 0qb < . 
Now consider the case where the housing market conforms to the matching model in 
Section 3.2. Now, tenants faced with lower benefits can bargain for lower rents for an 
equivalent quality property without losing the contract, even if rents elsewhere in the market 
are unaffected. So, the matching model predicts: 
3. Benefit reform leads to falling benefits for the affected tenants. This group pays 
lower rents without adjusting housing quality, so in our models: 0bb < , 0rb < , 
0qb =  
Both models predict that the effect of the reforms on the rent depends on the market 
proportion of tenants who are affected by the reforms. But again, the matching model differs 
from the competitive model in that only new claimants who are affected by the subsidy 
reduction should receive the rent reductions. We test for this type of effect in the rent models 
using a measure of the impact of the reform at the local government level7. 
Another consideration is that Housing Benefit reform in a competitive market will lead 
to falling rents for all new private renters – not just benefit claimants – unless the markets for 
benefit-claiming and other private renters is highly segmented. 
 
4.3. Identification when there are length of tenure effects 
 
Our post-‘treatment’ groups have, by definition, shorter tenures than the pre-treatment 
groups. This would not present a problem if we could be sure that there was no general 
change over time in the relationship between length-of-tenure and our outcome variables – 
                                                 
6 This assumes away any rent stickiness for existing tenants in a competitive market. We assume that rents in the 
private, benefit-claiming sector track market rents in that sector, due to regular and frequent re-contracting, with 
low fixed costs. 
7 This information comes from Department of Social Security administrative records at the Unitary Authority 
level. 
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any difference in outcome between post-treatment and pre-treatment groups would measure 
the impact of the reforms. But, new, shorter tenancies may face higher rents than those in 
older, longer running tenancy agreements for reasons other than benefit reform. And if this 
pattern is changing over time it becomes impossible to identify the reform impacts without 
further assumptions. 
So, we have two identification strategies available: 1) look for breaks in the time series 
behaviour of new, shorter tenancies at the treatment dates; or 2) look for cross-sectional 
differences between our treatment group and some comparison group that we know was not 
subject to the benefit reforms. The first strategy requires some parametric assumption about 
the underlying trend in length of tenure effects. We assume that trends in benefits and rents 
are linear within tenure- length groups. 
The second strategy requires a suitable comparison group. New benefit rules apply to 
all Housing Benefit applicants across the country so we are unable to find a comparison 
group for Housing Benefit and rents within the benefit-claiming private rental sector8. But we 
can make a comparison with the social rented sector, for which the new rules do not apply. 
An obvious drawback, is that social rents are only weakly indexed to the private market, so 
trends in rents and benefits may deviate from those in the private rental sector, even in the 
absence of the reforms. Nevertheless, comparison with benefit claimants in the social sector 
is useful, if only to highlight any differences in outcomes for similar households according to 
their tenancy group. 
Another approach is to compare rents (but not benefits) in the benefit-claiming private 
sector with other rents in the private sector, as discussed at the very end of Section 4.1. The 
problem here of course is that the composition of the non-claimant sector is entirely different 
from the claimant sector. 
 
4.4. Data and sample selection 
 
We apply all these strategies to data from two main sources: the Family Resources Survey  
(FRS) from April 1994 to March 2000, and the Survey of English Housing (SOEH), April 
1993 to March 2000. The more recent years of the FRS (2000, 2001) are not used, because of 
the likelihood of increasing recall errors and regarding start of tenure dates around the time of 
                                                 
8 If we are considering rents only, then students might be a suitable comparison group, since they are ineligible 
for Housing Benefit. Obviously, they are no use as a comparison group for measuring benefit changes. In any 
case, the student group in our sample is too small. 
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the benefit reforms. Only the English regions of the FRS are used, so that we have 
comparable samples from both data sets. Both data sets contain information on housing 
tenure, length of residence, housing costs, the receipt of Housing Benefit and labour market 
information. We suspect that reported benefits are measured with error in both datasets. To 
minimise errors due to mis-reporting by non-claimants, we restrict the sample to those 
households whose characteristics mean that they should be entitled to Housing Benefit. We 
also omit those in this group who do not report receiving any Housing Benefit even though 
they report being on Income Support as these ‘zeroes’ are also very likely to be mistakes.  
Specifically, our baseline results come from a sub-sample of households with: at least one 
member claiming Housing Benefit, no member working, and a head of household between 
ages 18 and 64 who was not a student or retired person. We split this sample into private 
tenants and social tenants. Summary statistics for the base sample are presented in Table 14 
in Appendix C. 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1. General trends and patterns  
 
Let us look first at the aggregate pattern in Housing Benefit claims. Table 1 shows the figures 
for Britain from May 1996, after the Local Reference Rent scheme was introduced, up to 
2002. These figures are compiled from administrative data and show the stock of cases 
recorded in May of each year, along with mean ‘eligible’ rents, mean Housing Benefit 
payments and the ratio of mean eligible rents to mean Housing Benefit. The term ‘eligible 
rent’ refers to the amount of a tenant's rental liability which can be met by Housing Benefit, 
after adjustment for service charges, meals, abnormally high rents and the Local Reference 
Rent (see Appendix C). Rents and benefits are in 1996 prices. The top panel of the tables 
shows all Housing Benefit cases. The second panel shows all private sector cases, including 
‘regulated’ rents in the private sector (regulated as ‘fair rents’, under legislation predating the 
1988 Housing Act), and Registered Social Landlords (principally housing associations). The 
third panel shows figures for all ‘de-regulated’ tenancies, meaning those in which rents are 
market determined, and thus liable to some sort of benefit capping. These rents can be 
assessed occur under pre-1996 rules, when rents were assessed by the local rent officer in a 
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fairly ad-hoc fashion – shown in the fourth panel. Or they may be assessed under the 1996 
and 1997 Local Reference Rent schemes – fifth panel. 
The total number claiming Housing Benefit has declined by around 20% over this 
period. At the same time, the number of private deregulated benefit recipients fell by 248,000 
(29%). This change is documented in Wilcox (2001), who attributes much of the decline to 
the 1996 and 1997 changes in the Housing Benefit system. We need to be cautious about 
inferring too much from these trends, since the patterns of claims reflect changes in the 
labour market, household incomes, benefit entitlement, and housing supply, in addition to 
changes in the way the system is administered. For instance, the number of claims from 
council tenants also fell by 27% (754,000) between May 1997 and May 2002, whilst claims 
from tenants of Registered Social Landlords rose by 275,000 (35%). Since neither of these 
groups pay market rents, they are largely unaffected by the reforms. The total number of 
cases assessed under the Local Reference Rent (LRR) schemes shows no clear trend, but has 
risen rapidly as a proportion of all private deregulated tenancies. This simply reflects the 
inflow and outflow rates of private tenant claims; by 2002, 97.1% of the stock claims must 
have started after January 1996. 
Mean rents have continued to grow in excess of general price inflation over the 1990s, 
especially in the de-regulated private sector covered by the Local Reference Rent Scheme. 
Eligible rents assessed under the LRR scheme rose by 22% between May 1996 and May 
2002. However, it does look like the LRR system might have had an effect. Certainly, the 
eligible rents and the amount post-1996 claimants receive in benefits are lower than they are 
for claimants still assessed under the old rules. The difference, shown at the bottom of the 
table, is around £7 (in 1996 prices), or about 12%. Note though, we have no information here 
on what rent the tenant is actually paying, only what the Local Authority takes into account 
for assessment of housing benefit. What is more, simple comparisons of new and old-rule 
claimants do not take into account the tenure- length differences between the two groups. For 
all these issues, we need more detailed survey data. 
We look now, in Figure 4, at the picture for workless households in our FRS and SOEH 
samples. The figure traces mean log-Housing Benefit for three tenure- length groups, from 
1993/1994 to 1999/20009. If the 1996 reforms had any bite on mean Housing Benefit 
payments, we should see falling mean benefits for short-tenure households after 1996/1997. 
Although Housing Benefit receipts for the short-tenure groups seems to have been quite 
                                                 
9 The basic summary statistics are in Appendix D. 
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stable over this period, they have fallen relative to the HB receipts of longer-tenure 
households, suggesting that the reforms might have had some bite. 
Many of these changes will be linked to underlying changes in rents, which we consider 
next. Figure 5 and Figure 6 illustrate the trends for log rents over the 1990s for: (a) private 
sector workless households; (b) social sector workless households and (c) private sector non-
claimant households. Some general patterns are evident. Private tenants with longer tenures 
(over 3 years) generally pay lower rents than those with short tenure (3 years or less), with a 
gap of over 35% in 1994. This differential may be in part due to historical changes in rent 
control, with a few long-tenure rents still controlled under the ‘fair rents’ scheme of the 1965 
Rent Act, and others regulated as shorthold tenancies under the 1988 Housing Act. But 
transaction, search and information costs may play their part too. Landlords avoid transaction 
and search costs if they extend an existing tenancy agreement with a known tenant, and some 
of this may be passed on to tenants as lower rent increases. What is striking about Figure 5 
and Figure 6 though, is that whilst this tenure-length differential has persisted amongst 
working tenants, we see it almost completely eroded in the private, benefit-claiming sector by 
the 1999/2000. And this can, for the most part, be put down to decreasing or non- increasing 
real rents for short-tenure, benefit claimants. Certainly any number of factors could be at 
work here, but one candidate could be increasing ‘toughness’ in the rules for administration 
of Housing Benefit.  
One of the first objectives of the paper then is to find out if the LRR reforms actually 
had any effect on Housing Benefits. We go on to this in some detail below. But first, we 
present some direct evidence based on a question in the Survey of English Housing that asks 
directly about benefit reductions. The survey asks “Is the benefit based on the full rent, or a 
reduced figure determined by the Rent Officer”. Table 1 tabulates the responses for workless 
households. There is no obvious trend to be seen here, though the last two post-reform years 
have high significantly (p-value < 0.001) higher proportions reporting a reduced figure (28% 
and 33% respectively). 
 
5.2. Regression results 
 
The trends in Figure 4 to Figure 6 do not clearly delineate the groups affected and unaffected 
by the reforms, and the aggregate data in Table 1 is uninformative about compositional 
changes and actual rent payments. A better way to look at the reform is through the effects on 
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individuals making new claims, using the FRS and SOEH data and the empirical model of 
Section 4. The next sections present these results. 
Table 3 to Table 9 provide OLS regression results from this exercise, for the outcomes 
described in Section 4.1, using FRS and SOEH data. In all Tables, Set (1) includes only year 
dummies, regional dummies and length of tenure dummies as control variables. Set (2) adds 
in basic household demographics and the number of rooms occupied by the household. Set 
(3) allows for general changes in the length-of-tenure effects by interacting length-of-tenure 
dummies with a linear time trend. The tables report only the coefficients of interest, and tests 
of significance. The coefficients are those relating to our policy reform ‘treatment’ variables: 
the probability that the household moved after the policy reform dates, and the probability 
that the head of household ended work after the reform dates. All the coefficients are ´ 100, 
so show the percentage change in outcome. 
 
5.2.1 Housing Benefit 
 
The first step is to confirm whether the introduction of Local Reference Rents had any ‘bite’ 
on household Housing Benefit receipts in our data. The aggregate administrative data 
discussed in 5.1 certainly suggest that many payments were assessed on the basis of the LRR 
rules, and that claimants were receiving less under the new scheme. Table 3 and Table 4 look 
again at this issue, using log-Housing Benefit as the dependent variable. Looking at the first 
results for private tenants, in Column (a) and Column (c) of both tables, it seems that new 
Housing Benefit claimants in the private sector received lower benefits relative to 
comparable claimants who started their tenancy in the pre-reform years. Adding income and 
demographic controls in Column (c) has little effect. The figures suggest that benefits for 
claimants in new private tenancies after January 1996 were at least 10% down compared to 
those starting similar tenancies pre-1996. After 1997, when the allowance for ‘high rents’ 
above the LRR was removed, this relative disadvantage increases to 15%-18%. Entry into 
unemployment after these dates is also associated with lower Housing Benefits, but these 
effects are smaller and rarely significant 10. In terms of our empirical specification in 4.1, we 
have 0bb < . 
Columns (b) and (d) show no effects of comparable magnitudes for social tenants who 
moved after the 1996 reforms, or for those who became unemployed over the period. But 
                                                 
10 The numbers entering unemployment after the reform dates are quite low. See Table 14 in Appendix D. 
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there is a fall of about 5% in the value of benefit claims for social tenants who moved after 
October 1997. This cannot be attributed to the reforms, since social tenants are exempt11, but 
might reflect unobserved general differences in the composition of Housing Benefit 
claimants, or something else specific to the social rental sector. To err on the side of caution, 
we could use a difference in difference approach and deduct any observed contemporaneous 
changes on social tenants when we report the reform impacts on the private sector. 
A look back at Figure 4 shows that housing benefit trends are not the same for all 
tenure- length groups. As we noted above (Section 4.3) this is a problem, since our LRR-
covered tenants are all short-tenure. The most general specification in Set (3) allows for 
differences in the general time trend by length-of-tenure groups. The effect of this is to drive 
all the coefficients towards zero, and render them insignificant at conventional levels – even 
when tested as a group. By contrast, the length-of-tenure-time interactions are jointly highly 
significant for private tenants. The main lesson to be learnt from this is that it is not possible 
to distinguish the impacts of the reforms from general changes in the relationship between 
length of tenure and rents over time. This does not mean that the reforms had no impact – it 
seems certain from the administrative data that the benefit rules had some effect on benefits. 
But we cannot be certain from our data that the effects we observe are not attributable to a 
general tendency over time for low length-of-tenure claimants in the private sector to receive 




If the intention of the reforms was purely to bring down benefit payments in this sector then, 
on this evidence, they must be judged a success. But how has the burden of this reduction in 
subsidy been divided between tenants and the private landlords providing rental 
accommodation? Have tenants or landlords become worse off? To answer this we must look 
at rents, though as we shall see, the answer is not clear-cut. Table 5 and Table 6 show the 
results from the FRS and SOEH respectively. The dependent variable is the log of weekly 
rents. 
There are notable similarities between these tables and the Housing Benefit results. The 
reforms have strong negative impacts on movers in the private sector, particularly for 1997. 
                                                 
11 Except some those with some Registered Social Landlords. These are only 1% of the LRR-covered sector and 
are not identified in our data. 
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For social tenants, we detect a fall in rents of 3%-4% for movers after October 1997, which 
cannot be attributed to benefit reform. Adding demographics and tenure controls makes little 
difference in Set (2), but introducing length-of-tenure-time-trend interactions wipes out the 
estimated impacts in Set (3). As before, we cannot distinguish reform impacts from general 
changes in the relationship between length of tenure and rents. Note that there are no separate 
effects for claimants becoming unemployed after the reforms – rents are only affected for 
those moving to new accommodation. 
But there are some anomalies. For the SOEH, the changes in rents reflected in the 
coefficients in Table 6 are a very close match to the changes in benefits recorded in Table 4. 
The picture we get from the SOEH is of private tenants affected by the LRR reforms 
receiving some 10% to 13% less in benefits, but paying a similar proportion less in rents 
compared to those unaffected by the reforms12. This is highly supportive of our matching 
model of the housing market, and suggests that the burden of the subsidy reduction largely 
fell on landlords (assuming we have adequately controlled for housing quantity and quality). 
But the FRS tells a slightly different story. Benefits for movers affected by the LRR reforms 
fell by 10%-13%, whilst rents fell by much less – by 5% after January 1996, and by 7% after 
October 1997. And the FRS rent results are less statistically significant than those from the 
SOEH13. Still, the effects for movers after both reforms are negative and individually and 
jointly significant at the 5% level when we control for household characteristics. In term of 
our empirical model, we find that 0rb < , and that r bb b£ . 
Both our theoretical models predict that rents will fall by more when tenant s covered by 
the reform take a larger market share. In the competitive case, rents are lowered throughout 
the sector. In the matching case, rents are lowered for new claimants only. We look for this in 
Table 11, using the Local/Unitary Authority proportion of all benefit claimants subject to the 
post-96 reforms as an indicator of market share. This is an imperfect measure, because the 
denominator includes claimants in the social rented sector, whereas we really want the private 
market share. Yet we see some evidence that a higher local proportion of affected claimants 
in the local market leads to lower rents in Column (a), and in (b) where we re-introduce the 
                                                 
12 Here we treat the reductions experienced by social tenants as non-reform related and deduct these from the 
private tenant impacts. 
13 The contradiction between the FRS and SOEH results is a data anomaly, for which we are unable to find a 
good explanation. Comparison of the means and standard deviations of all the variables shows that the samples 
are closely matched (Table  14 in Appendix C), although mean benefit/rent ratios are 2.5 percentage points lower 
in the FRS than the SOEH, and the difference is significant. One symptom of the discrepancy is evident in 
Figure 5 and Figure 6: rents for longer-tenure tenants in the FRS are higher in 1994/5 and show a slower rate of 
growth than in the SOEH. 
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household level ‘treatment’ variables. Column (c) interacts the market share variable with the 
treatment variables; the coefficients remain negative but are insignificant, so there is no 
further information here that helps us discriminate between our competitive and matching 
models. 
We make one further comparison in Table 10, by looking at rents for non-claimant, 
working households. In a purely competitive market, any effects of subsidy reduction on 
rents should be felt throughout the market, and will also impact on the rents paid by new 
tenants who are not benefit claimants. But this is not obviously what has happened. Many of 
the coefficients in this table are negative, but all are of low significance, especially compared 
with the rent effects on claimants in Table 5 and Table 6. It really does appear that if rents 
fall, they do so only for claimants directly affected by the 1996 and 1997 reforms. 
 
5.2.3 Benefit-rent ratios 
 
The discrepancy between the results from the FRS and SOEH becomes even more evident in 
Table 7 and Table 8. These results pull together what we have found so far, by exploring the 
impact of the LRR reforms on the benefit-rent ratio. If rents and benefits fall by the same 
proportion, then there is no immediate impact on the incomes, net of housing costs. But if 
rents fall by less than benefits then the benefit to rent ratio falls and claimants are worse off. 
From the FRS (Table 7), we find that benefit-rent ratios are systematically lower in the post-
reform period for private tenants. The average tenant affected by the LRR reforms suffers a 
4%-6% reduction in the benefit/rent ratio, with particularly important changes for movers. At 
the sample mean for workless private tenants, this amounts to a 10%-15% reduction in 
disposable incomes14. The coefficients become insignificant when length-of-tenure-time-
trend interactions are included, though these interactions are statistically insignificant and 
unnecessary. In contrast, the figures from the SOEH (Table 8) suggest that benefit/rent ratios 
were unaffected – except for those becoming unemployed after the October 1997 reforms. 
The reform ‘treatment’ coefficients are jointly insignificant. According to the SOEH data, 
rents and benefits fell by the same proportion, and tenants are not, on average worse off after 
the LRR reforms. 
 
                                                 
14 Define h as the benefit/rent ratio and m as the income/rent ratio. We can write income after housing costs as y 
= [m – (1–h)]´ r. The proportional change in y with respect to a small change ¶h is ¶h/[m – (1–h)]. Substituting 
sample means of m=1.29 and h=0.89 gives the result. 
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5.2.4 Housing quality 
 
As noted in the Sections 3.1and 4.1, tenants may downsize in response to a reduction in 
subsidy. Rents may stay constant, but tenants bear the burden through reduced housing 
quality. We included housing size (rooms) as a control in our rent and benefit models, but 
now examine the downsizing issue more explicitly using number of rooms as the dependent 
variable. The regression coefficients in Table 9 gives some indication that private tenants 
covered by the post-1996 reforms live in smaller accommodation than their pre-reform 
counterpart. The reduction is about 1 room less in every four or five households, which seems 
large, but the effects are statistically very weak. Perhaps this is too crude a measure of 
housing quality to be really informative, but substitution to smaller dwellings does not seem 





We have looked at the impacts of Housing Benefit reform on a number of outcomes for 
tenants in England, and assessed our findings in the light of two competing models of rent 
determination  – a competitive and a matching model. 
The 1996 and 1997 reforms to the British Housing Benefit system seem to have had an 
impact on private tenant Housing Benefits. Average claims fell for private sector moving 
after the benefits reforms, relative to existing claimants in the private sector and relative to 
new and existing claimants in the social sector. The benefit gap in our data is around 10%-
13%, which corresponds closely to the aggregate administrative figures.   
Our theoretical framework made the point that changes to rent subsidies, in a purely 
competitive, non-segmented housing market should alter rents throughout the market. We do 
find that the reduction in effective rent subsidy introduced by the 1996/1997 Housing Benefit 
reforms has fed through into lower rents. But contrary to the competitive model, this happens 
only for tenants whose claims would have been assessed under the new benefit rules and 
were in a position to negotiate lower rents – that is, private sector benefit-claiming tenants 
who moved into new accommodation after the reforms. Claimants under pre-1996 rules and 
non-claimants are not affected. This is hard to reconcile with a purely competitive market, 
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since landlords have no reason to accept rents from benefit claimants that are below market 
value. An alternative model, such as a matching model, is more appropriate. 
We are unable to make many firm statements about the size of rent reductions that have 
occurred. Results from one source, the Survey of English Housing, suggest that rents have 
fallen by the same proportion as benefits. Landlords have borne the burden of the reduction in 
rent subsidy and tenants are no worse off than before the reform. This is ‘music to the ears’ 
for policy makers. But the results from the Family Resources Survey show rents falling by 
less than benefits. The burden is shared between tenants and landlords, and tenants have seen 
an average reduction of 10%-15% in disposable income as a result of the reforms. 
Our results come with one severe health warning. The fall in rents and benefits for new 
claimants after 1996, relative to those with longer tenures, might have occurred without the  
reforms due to falling rent differentials between short and long-tenure private tenants. Our 
results indicate that these general changes in length-of-tenure rent trends have been important 
during the 1990s, and that they can equally well explain the patterns that we attribute to 
Housing Benefit reform. These trends can also generate the pre-reform and post-reform 
benefit differentials in the aggregate administrative figures. Differentials in rents and benefits 
between claimants assessed under the post-1996 rules (shorter tenure) and those assessed 
under the old rules (longer tenure) might just reflect that fact that longer-tenure rents are 
rising faster than shorter-tenure rents. It is the fact that these changes have occurred only in 
the benefit-claiming private rental sector that leads us to conclude that the Housing Benefit 
system reforms must be a driving force behind the changes. 
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Appendix A:  Housing Benefit 
 
This description of the Housing Benefit system is taken from DWP (2002): 
 
Housing Benefit reformed scheme introduced April 1988 
 
Housing Benefit (HB) is administered by Local Authorities. People are eligible only if they 
are liable to pay rent (or are treated as if they were so liable) in respect of the dwelling they 
occupy as their home. Couples are treated as a single benefit unit. The amount of benefit 
depends on eligible rent, income, deductions in respect of any non-dependants, deductions 
where food, fuel and water are included and the applicable amount. Also, people who are 
liable to pay rent but who have capital in excess of £16,000 are not entitled to Housing 
Benefit. 
‘Eligible rent’ is the amount of a tenant's rental liability that can be met by Housing 
Benefit. Payments made by owner occupiers do not count but payments such as mooring 
charges for houseboats, site fees for mobile homes, rental purchase payments, mesne profits 
and payments for compulsory housing - related services all count for Housing Benefit. 
Deductions are made for service charges in the rent which relate to personal needs, such as 
the supply of meals. Housing Benefit may also be reduced if the amount of rent payable is 
unreasonably high or the accommodation is over- large or if the claimant or their partner is a 
full time student. 
The ‘Local Reference Rent (LRR) Scheme’ was introduced on 2 January 1996 and has 
been applied to new and change of address claims from certain private sector tenants, 
claiming on or after that date. The LRR is an average amount of rent, which reflects the 
general level of rents for similar sized properties in the locality of the tenancy, and it is an 
additional value used in the calculation of the eligible amount. However, where the Claim 
Related Rent is more than the LRR, generally, 50% of the difference between the actual rent 
and the LRR is met, thereby increasing the amount of eligible rent used to calculate Housing 
Benefit. 
On 6 October 1997, the LRR Scheme rules were amended, and the 50% addition was 
removed from the calculation of the eligible rent for all new claims. 
On 7 October 1996, the ‘Single Room Rent (SRR) Scheme’ was applied to single 
people under 25 without dependent children in certain private sector tenancies. The SRR is an 
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average amount of rent reflecting the general level of rents for a single room with shared 
facilities in the locality of the tenancy. The SRR restricts the amount of rent that can be used 
to calculate HB. 
The authorities have discretion to allow higher amounts of HB to alleviate exceptional 
hardship where the LRR or SRR restricts the amount of rent used to calculate HB. 
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Appendix B:  Solution of the Matching Model 
 
For those in the untreated group, the maximisation of (11) this leads to a first-order condition 
that can be written as: 
 0 0( ) (1 )( )u u uV Vlr lP - P = - -  (17) 
while for the treated tenants we have that: 
 ( ) 0 0( ) (1 )( )t t tV Vl r h l+ P - P = - -  (18) 
The difference in the first-order conditions reflects the fact that the treated tenants pay a 
higher fraction of their housing costs.  Define p i =(Pi-P0) and vi =(Vi-V0) for i=u,t. Then, 
from (4)-(10) we have that: 
 ( )u u uv y r s vd r b= - - +  (19) 
 ( ) ( )t t tv y r s vd r h b= - + - +  (20) 
 ( ) ( )u u t u ur sdp gq p p g p= - - - +  (21) 
 (1 ) ( ) ( )t t u t tr sdp q g p p g p= - - - - +  (22) 
These can be solved to give: 
 ( ) ( )u us v y rd b r+ + = -  (23)  
 ( )( )( ) t ts v y rd b r h+ + = - +  (24) 
 
[ ]





















+ + = -
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 (26) 
Using (23)-(26) in (17) and (18) we get the equations (12) and (13)for the 
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Figure 1:  Median real weekly rents for private-sector tenants 
Notes:  Source is Family Expenditure Survey. The sample is restricted to households of 
working age. A typical sample size in each year is about 120 for workless households and 






















Figure 2:  Housing benefit as proportion of selected benefits, 1991-2001 
Notes:  The benefits included in the denominator are Unemployment Benefit & Jobseeker's 
Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, Income Support and Housing Benefit. 
The figures relate to households of working age. 
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Figure 4:  Housing benefit trends, by length of tenure: 
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tenants, non claimants 
Figure 6:  Rent trends by length of tenure, soeh 
30 
Tables 
Table 1:  Housing benefit caseload, Great Britain 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
All Housing Benefit cases:        
Total number 4776000 4640000 4475000 4313000 4033000 3874000 3813000 
Mean eligible rents 46.61 47.49 47.88 48.95 50.52 52.09 54.89 
Mean Housing Benefit  41.92 42.67 42.68 44.01 45.7 47.53 50.46 
        
All private tenants1 1878000 1848000 1811000 1795000 1745000 1741000 1775000 
 56.49 57.21 58.09 58.65 59.70 60.84 64.30 
 52.30 52.63 53.08 53.61 54.49 55.81 59.32 
        
Private deregulated tenants        
Total number - 869000 799000 749000 687000 634000 621000 
Mean eligible rents - 64.33 64.45 64.54 65.56 67.35 71.03 
Mean Housing Benefit  - 60.33 60.02 59.98 60.64 62.05 65.41 
        
Pre-1996 scheme cases:        
Mean eligible rents - 70.66 70.91 71.48 72.56 71.91 76.48 
Mean Housing Benefit  - 66.28 66.28 66.92 67.74 67.16 72.14 
        
1996 and 1997 scheme 
cases: 
       
Total number 229000 502000 549000 567000 553000 528000 603000 
Mean eligible rents 57.88 62.24 63.44 63.68 65.00 67.26 70.66 
Mean Housing Benefit  53.99 58.21 59.03 59.02 59.83 61.95 64.85 
% of all private deregulated  57.8% 68.7% 75.7% 80.5% 83.3% 97.1% 
        
Difference between new 
and old scheme 
       
Mean eligible rents - 8.42 7.47 7.80 7.56 4.65 5.82 
Mean Housing Benefit  - 8.07 7.25 7.90 7.91 5.21 7.29 
        
Source:  DSS Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit Management Information System Quarterly 100% 
caseload stock-count taken in May 2000. 
Additional figures (May 01, May 02) from DWP (2002) 
1 Includes registered social landlords 
- data unavailable 
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Table 2:  Reduced benefit payments, survey of  
English housing 
 Housing benefit payment 
 Full Reduced 
Survey year   
1993/4 154 64 
 70.64% 29.36% 
   1994/5 197 58 
 77.25% 22.75% 
   1995/6 261 67 
 79.57% 20.43% 
   1996/7 256 49 
 83.93% 16.07% 
   1997/8 213 63 
 77.17% 22.83% 
   1998/9 192 76 
 71.64% 28.36% 
   1999/2000 149 73 
 67.12% 32.88% 
   All years 1,422 450 
 75.96% 24.04% 
   Notes:  Table shows cell counts and annual percentages for 








Table 3:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on log housing benefit receipt, 
family resources survey 1994-2000 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.000 0.017 0.000 0.021 0.579 0.560 
Joint test of ‘move’ 
coefficients 
0.000 0.023 0.000 0.013 0.389 0.715 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.030 0.511 
R2 0.294 0.288 0.417 0.352 0.421 0.353 
Sample size 2152 8634 2152 8634 2152 8634 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
and time trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 




Table 4:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on log hous ing benefit receipt, 
survey of English housing 1993-2000 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p -value 
0.003 0.188 0.005 0.088 0.544 0.286 
Joint test of ‘move’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.019 0.115 0.007 0.230 0.977 0.951 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.004 0.659 
R2 0.313 0.235 0.445 0.295 0.450 0.295 
Sample size 1643 7769 1643 7769 1643 7769 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
– year trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student  
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Table 5:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on log-rents, 
family resources survey 1994-2000 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.224 0.389 0.119 0.136 0.869 0.666 
Joint test of new tenancy 
coefficients p-value 
0.076 0.243 0.031 0.076 0.826 0.931 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.043 0.491 
R2 0.263 0.343 0.381 0.395 0.386 0.396 
Sample size 2152 8634 2152 8634 2152 8634 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
and time trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student 
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Table 6:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on log-rents, 
survey of English housing 1993-2000 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.003 0.157 0.002 0.268 0.519 0.874 
Joint test of ‘move’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.003 0.158 0.001 0.133 0.588 0.998 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.047 0.010 
R2 0.343 0.308 0.475 0.357 0.479 0.358 
Sample size 1643 7769 1643 7769 1643 7769 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
– year trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student  
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Table 7:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms  housing benefit to rent ratio, 
family resources survey 1994-2000 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.002 0.033 0.001 0.013 0.052 0.106 
Joint test of ‘move’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.011 0.032 0.012 0.093 0.286 0.618 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.579 0.752 
R2 0.047 0.035 0.105 0.086 0.110 0.086 
Sample size 2152 8634 2152 8634 2152 8634 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
- year trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student  
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Table 8:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms housing benefit to rent ratio, 
survey of English housing 1994-1999 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































































Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.128 0.711 0.295 0.406 0.281 0.554 
Joint test of ‘move’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.979 0.389 0.701 0.637 0.850 0.862 
Joint test of tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - - - 0.410 0.395 
R2 0.030 0.043 0.125 0.105 0.128 0.105 
Sample size 1643 7769 1643 7769 1643 7769 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year 
Set (1) plus log household 
income, no. of rooms, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of children, 
Set (2) plus length of tenure 
– year trend interactions 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student  
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Table 9:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on private rental rooms per 
household, frs and soeh 
 FRS SoEH 
 (a) (b) 










Joint test of ‘treatment’ 
coefficients p-value 
0.258 0.151 
R2 0.409 0.434 
Sample size 2152 1643 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, 
year, log household 
income, male head, age 
group, household 
composition, number of 
adults, number of 
children 
Length of tenure, region, 
year, log household 
income, rooms, male 
head, age group, 
household composition, 
number of adults, 
number of children 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of 
household, non-retired, non-student  
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Table 10:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms on log-rents, non-claimant private-renter 
households, frs and soeh 
 FRS SOEH 
 Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) Set (1) Set (2) Set (3) 

































0.679 0.860 0.377 0.205 0.362 0.768 
Joint test of 
tenure-trend 
interactions 
- - 0.611 - - 0.078 
R2 0.239 0.373 0.374 0.263 
 
0.347 0.349 
Sample size 4938 4938 4938 4581 4581 4581 
Other controls See set definitions in Tables above 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student 
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Table 11:  Impact of 1996 and 1997 reforms, market effects on rents, family resources 
survey 1994-2000 
 (a) (b) (c) 











































- - -4.809 
(-0.91) 




0.034 0.015 0.027 
Joint test of 
market effects 
0.034 0.053 0.082 
R2 0.356 0.382 0.383 
Sample size 2152 2152 2152 
Other controls Length of tenure, region, year, 
log household income, rooms, 
male head, age group, household 
composition, number of adults, 
number of children 
Length of tenure, region, year, 
log household income, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of adults, 
number of children 
Length of tenure, region, year, 
log household income, male 
head, age group, household 
composition, number of adults, 
number of children 
Reported parameters are regression coefficients  ´100 for log-rents 
Robust t -statistics in parentheses 
Bold coefficients significant at 1% level, Underline significant at 5% level 
Sample is households in receipt of Housing Benefit, with workless head of household, non-retired, non-student  
 41 
Appendix C:  Summary Statistics 
Table 12:  Workless households’ housing benefit 
Means, standard deviations and sample frequencies, Family Resources Survey 
Length of tenure 
 Less than 1 year 1 year to 3 years More than 3 years All tenures 
Survey year     
1994/5 71.53 76.12 57.30 69.63 
 31.40 33.75 37.97 34.52 
 170 131 95 396 
     1995/6 78.26 73.61 66.74 73.94 
 36.19 30.64 45.01 37.20 
 173 125 98 396 
     1996/7 67.20 79.37 60.37 70.53 
 24.32 31.58 33.53 30.47 
 135 145 82 362 
     1997/8 67.67 73.37 65.62 69.28 
 23.37 33.35 35.30 30.48 
 127 121 79 327 
     1998/9 68.14 75.47 69.11 70.90 
 28.75 28.86 35.14 30.82 
 119 107 90 316 
     1999/2000 70.16 74.009 70.999 71.67 
 36.29 32.40 33.95 34.32 
 123 105 88 316 
     All years 70.96 75.48 65.01 71.03 
 30.98 31.83 37.40 33.22 
 847 734 532 2113 
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Table 13:  Workless households’ hous ing benefit 
Means, standard deviations and sample frequencies, Survey of English Housing 
Length of tenure 
 Less than 1 year 1 year to 3 years More than 3 years All tenures 
Survey year     
1993/4 73.67 75.31 41.61 66.79 
 41.15 39.55 18.90 39.06 
 99 68 50 217 
     1994/5 68.77 79.96 47.81 67.46 
 29.60 35.94 24.56 32.61 
 131 79 59 269 
     1995/6 74.94 76.890 56.08 71.23 
 38.90 32.47 25.88 34.95 
 148 123 82 353 
     1996/7 68.07 83.78 58.43 70.94 
 27.98 36.57 32.69 33.51 
 139 106 77 322 
     1997/8 66.13 69.16 71.06 68.47 
 40.21 27.93 45.41 38.71 
 119 84 85 288 
     1998/9 65.76 71.27 58.61 65.60 
 26.02 35.93 30.44 31.12 
 114 98 82 294 
     1999/2000 65.03 66.16 73.21 67.79 
 25.61 25.36 39.26 30.25 
 87 75 67 229 
     All years 69.15 75.09 59.26 68.54 
 33.62 34.05 34.23 34.42 
 837 633 502 1972 
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Table 14:  Summary statistics for workless households in England 
receiving housing benefit  
 Family Resources Survey 
April 94 to Mar 00 
Survey of English Housing 
April 93 to Mar 00 
 Private Tenants Social Tenants Private Tenants Social Tenants 
































Moved Jan 1996 – Sept 1997 0.368 0.219 0.235 0.141 
Unemployed 1996 or later 0.045 0.062 0.097 0.066 
Moved Oct 1997 or later 0.137 0.070 0.095 0.042 
Unemployed 1998 or later 0.013 0.028 0.024 0.016 
Tenure<1yr 0.409 0.183 0.432 0.195 
1yr £ Tenure< 2yrs 0.216 0.141 0.201 0.140 
2yrs £ Tenure < 3yrs 0.127 0.115 0.124 0.101 
3yrs £ Tenure < 5yrs 0.119 0.152 0.121 0.145 
5yrs £ Tenure < 10yrs 0.071 0.189 0.060 0.194 
10yrs £ Tenure 0.058 0.220 0.063 0.225 
One adult only 0.380 0.282 0.388 0.301 
Couple, no children 0.107 0.122 0.090 0.103 
Couple, with children 0.139 0.173 0.134 0.198 
Lone parent 0.356 0.401 0.335 0.378 
Multiple occupancy 0.018 0.022 0.053 0.020 
















Male head of household 0.508 0.471 0.536 0.490 
Age 18-25 0.230 0.146 0.223 0.146 
Age 26-30 0.193 0.161 0.191 0.166 
Age 31-40 0.278 0.293 0.278 0.267 
Age 41-50 0.154 0.176 0.155 0.192 
Age 51-60 0.106 0.167 0.121 0.174 
Age 61+ 0.039 0.057 0.032 0.055 








Sample size 2155 8633 1643 7769 
Sample statistics are unweighted 
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